查看原文
其他

海外之声 | 拉加德:如何促进而不是阻碍全球增长

拉加德 IMI财经观察 2022-05-03

导读


世界货币基金组织预测,2019年下半年,全球经济增长将有所回升,并且在2020年进一步加速至3.6%,增速与2018年持平。全球经济活动将受益于美联储和欧洲央行更耐心的货币正常化步伐,以及中国财政刺激措施的增加。最近的经济数据表明,全球经济增长与货币基金组织预测的情形基本一致。

然而,实现强劲增长的道路并不一帆风顺。首先,人们对经济增长的预期回升仍抱有疑虑。发达经济体的增长势头、承压经济体的改善情况、英国“脱欧”的进程等问题还亟待解决。同时,全球经济存在潜在脆弱性,并且许多经济体中期增长前景令人失望,这不仅仅是人口老龄化和生产率增长缓慢所致,还由于过度的经济不平等造成的侵蚀性影响。

除此之外,全球贸易紧张局势愈演愈烈。货币基金组织估计,中美加征的关税将导致2020年的全球GDP下降0.5%。保护主义措施不仅损害了经济增长和就业,还提高了可贸易消费品的价格,给低收入家庭带来不成比例的损害。

为了消除以上这些障碍并支持经济增长反弹,当务之急是解决当前的贸易紧张局势,加快国际贸易体系的现代化建设。同时,我们还要提高经济韧性和包容性,实施更多的结构性改革。若增长受阻,则需开展协调工作。

作者 | 克里斯蒂娜•拉加德,国际货币基金组织总裁

英文原文如下:


How to Help, Not Hinder Global Growth

Christine Lagarde

Introduction

As the G-20 finance ministers and central bank governors gather this week in Fukuoka, they can take inspiration from their host city. Known as Japan’s “startup city,” Fukuoka has flourished in recent decades by embracing trade, innovation, and openness.

That spirit is needed more than ever to help reduce trade tensions and clear other stumbling blocks on the way back to higher and more sustainable growth. The goal must be to help, not stand in the way of global growth.

Signs of stabilization

In April, I described the global economy as being at a “delicate moment.” The IMF cut its global growth forecast to 3.3 percent in 2019, largely because of temporary, country-specific factors and the tangible effects of trade tensions. At the same time, we projected a pickup in growth in the second half of this year and a further acceleration to 3.6 percent in 2020, the same growth rate as in 2018.

Our expectation was that global economic activity would also benefit from the more patient pace of monetary normalization by the US Fed and the European Central Bank, and from increased fiscal stimulus in China. And indeed, these policy responses have provided vital support over the past few months, including by easing financial conditions and increasing capital flows to emerging markets.

In fact, the most recent economic data indicate that global growth may be stabilizing—broadly as we had forecast. For example, while first-quarter economic activity disappointed in parts of emerging Asia and Latin America, growth was stronger than expected in the United States, the euro area, and Japan. 

So, there is some good news. Yet the road to stronger growth remains precarious. Why?

There are growing concerns over the impact of the current trade tensions.

Significant stumbling blocks

Let me highlight some of the significant stumbling blocks that could stand in the way of a rebound in growth:

For one, there are question marks over the expected uptick in growth. Will the first-quarter momentum in advanced economies hold up, and will the previously projected improvements in some stressed economies materialize or take longer than expected? How would a no-deal Brexit affect confidence? And will the recent increase in oil prices further depress economic activity?

Another stumbling block is the underlying vulnerability of the global economy. Corporate debt levels, for example, have increased to a point where a sudden shift in financial conditions could trigger disruptive capital outflows from emerging markets.

We also know that many economies are facing disappointing medium-term growth prospects, not just because of population aging and slow productivity, but also because of the corrosive effects of excessive economic inequality.

Trade tensions are looming larger

Most importantly, there are growing concerns over the impact of the current trade tensions. The risk is that the most recent US-China tariffs could further reduce investment, productivity, and growth. The just proposed US tariffs on Mexico are also of concern.

Indeed, there is strong evidence that the United States, China, and the world economy are the losers from the current trade tensions (see chart).

We estimate that the recently announced and envisaged US-China tariffs could subtract about 0.3 percent from global GDP in 2020, with more than half of the impact stemming from business confidence effects and negative financial market sentiment.

Overall, we estimate that US-China tariffs—including those implemented last year—could reduce global GDP by 0.5 percent in 2020 (see chart, bottom panel). This amounts to a loss of about US$455 billion, larger than the size of South Africa’s economy.

These are self-inflicted wounds that must be avoided. How? By removing the recently implemented trade barriers and by avoiding further barriers in whatever form.

The fact is that protectionist measures are not only hurting growth and jobs, but they are also making tradable consumer goods less affordable—and disproportionately harming low-income households.

The G-20 can help

So how can G-20 policymakers help to clear these stumbling blocks and support a rebound in growth? 

The immediate priority is to resolve the current trade tensions, while stepping up the modernization of the international trade system. This includes building consensus across countries on how to strengthen WTO rules, especially on subsidies, intellectual property, and trade in services. The goal is to create a more open, more stable, and more transparent trade system—one that is well-equipped to serve the needs of 21st-century economies.

For example, IMF research shows that liberalizing trade in services could add about US$350 billion to global GDP in the long run. These types of gains are critical if trade is to play its role in lifting living standards and creating new jobs with higher wages.

As countries are fixing the trade system, they also need to work together to reform international corporate taxation, strengthen the global financial safety net, and tackle the existential threat of climate change.

Strengthening resilience and inclusiveness

At the same time, we have to recognize that high public debt and low interest rates have left many countries with limited policy room for maneuver. Managing this challenge will require carefully calibrated fiscal policies that strike the right balance between growth, debt sustainability, and social objectives. 

We also need to address dislocations caused by trade and technological innovation, while doing more to support those left behind.

And we need further structural reforms: from lowering barriers to entry in retail and professional services, to encouraging greater participation of women in the workforce. Of course, each country will customize reforms to meet its needs—but we estimate that these types of measures, if jointly implemented, could boost G-20 GDP by 4 percent in the long term.

Importantly, structural reforms would also make growth more resilient and inclusive.

Coordinate if growth falters

Even as we strive to support a pickup in growth in this way, countries need to ask, “what if?” 

When the next downturn comes, which inevitably it will, policymakers may need to use all policy tools to maximize their combined effect. This means supporting demand through decisive monetary easing and fiscal stimulus wherever possible. It also means using these supportive policies to boost the impact of structural reforms where demand is weak.

Our G-20 note simulates a negative economic shock and the subsequent policy responses (see chart, top panel). Under one scenario, if all policy tools are used, G-20 output recovers significantly faster and more sustainably.

Moreover, policy coordination should not stop at the border. Our downturn simulation shows that, if all countries act decisively to stimulate their own growth, the positive spillovers reinforce each other. And if everyone is working to expand growth, everyone benefits from the efforts of others to a much greater effect overall (see chart, bottom panel).

Conclusion

Of course, international cooperation is not just required in a potential downturn. It is critical right now because allcountries continue to face a delicate moment. As the Japanese proverb goes: “Cross a shallow river as if it were deep.”

For the G-20 nations, crossing the river means working in partnership to help, not hinder the expected pickup in growth.

By harnessing the “Fukuoka spirit” of openness, policymakers can help remove the stumbling blocks and set the global economy on a more durable and inclusive path.

编译  韩子砚

编辑  代玥

来源  IMF

责编   胡晓涛、金天、蒋旭

监制  朱霜霜


点击查看近期热文

海外之声 | 欧央行副行长:继续推进欧洲经济货币联盟及其对欧洲国际地位的启示

海外之声 在贸易紧张期如何促进人民币国际化

海外之声 | “新常态”下通胀与失业率关系变化

海外之声 | 后脱欧时代的金融稳定:全球债务风险

海外之声 | 金融监管的匹配性原则:我们今后将何去何从?

欢迎加入群聊

为了增进与粉丝们的互动,IMI财经观察建立了微信交流群,欢迎大家参与。


入群方法:加群主为微信好友(微信号:imi605),添加时备注个人姓名(实名认证)、单位、职务等信息,经群主审核后,即可被拉进群。


欢迎读者朋友多多留言与我们交流互动,留言可换奖品:每月累积留言点赞数最多的读者将得到我们寄送的最新研究成果一份。

关于我们


中国人民大学国际货币研究所(IMI)成立于2009年12月20日,是专注于货币金融理论、政策与战略研究的非营利性学术研究机构和新型专业智库。研究所聘请了来自国内外科研院所、政府部门或金融机构的90余位著名专家学者担任顾问委员、学术委员和国际委员,80余位中青年专家担任研究员。


研究所长期聚焦国际金融、货币银行、宏观经济、金融监管、金融科技、地方金融等领域,定期举办国际货币论坛、货币金融圆桌会议、大金融思想沙龙、麦金农大讲坛、陶湘国际金融讲堂等高层次系列论坛或讲座,形成了《人民币国际化报告》《天府金融指数报告》《金融机构国际化报告》《中国财富管理报告》等一大批具有重要理论和政策影响力的学术成果。2018年研究所荣获中国人民大学优秀院属研究机构奖,在182家参评机构中排名第一。


2018年,研究所荣获中国人民大学优秀院属研究机构奖,在182家参评机构中排名第一;在《智库大数据报告(2018)》中获评A等级,在参评的1065个中国智库中排名前5%。

国际货币网:www.imi.ruc.edu.cn


微信号:IMI财经观察

(点击识别下方二维码关注我们)

理事单位申请、

学术研究和会议合作

联系方式:  

010-62516755 

imi@ruc.edu.cn

只分享最有价值的财经视点

We only share the most valuable financial insights

您可能也对以下帖子感兴趣

文章有问题?点此查看未经处理的缓存